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INSURANCE-BINDING EFFECT ON MORTAGEE OF
SETTLEMENT BETWEEN INSURED AND INSURER
Insured bought a truck-from the Elliott Equipment Company,
Bristol, Tennessee. She paid part cash and signed a conditional
sale contract for the balance of $3,684. The seller assigned the con-
tract to the plaintiff bank, and the latter's lien was duly endorsed
on the truck's certificate of title. On the date of the purchase, in-
sured obtained from defendant insurance company a physical dam-
age policy containing the usual loss payable clause, with a stipula-
tion as to the procedure to be adhered to in case of disagreement
between the insured and the insurer as to the amount of loss in-
curred:
Loss Payee: Any loss hereunder is payable as interest
may appear to the insured and Union Trust Corpora-
tion, Bristol, Tennessee.
The limit of the company's liability for loss shall not ex-
ceed the actual cash value of the automobile, or if the loss
is of a part thereof the actual cash value of such part, at
time of loss nor [sic] what it would then cost to repair
or replace the automobile or such part thereof with other
of like kind and quality, with deduction for depreciation
nor [sic] the applicable limit of liability stated in the
declarations.
While the policy was in force and the identity of the parties
remained unchanged, the truck sustained severe collision and fire
damages. After some negotiation insured, on advice of counsel, ac-
cepted $700 as a compromise settlement and executed an agree-
ment releasing the defendant insurer from further liability. Plaintiff
-bank during the negotiations refused to take any part, although it
had notice. The defendant issued its $700 draft payable to the
plaintiff bank, the insured, and the repairman. The plaintiff re-
fusing to endorse, the repairman obtained judgment for $344.33,
which was paid by the defendant. The balance of the settlement,
$355.67, was paid by an additional draft drawn payable to the
plaintiff and the insured. The plaintiff again refused to endorse
and instituted the instant action for $1,396 and interest, the full
amount for which it contends the insurance company is liable,
claiming that the damage to the vehicle was in excess of its instant
claim. The plaintiff obtained in the Corporation Court of the City
of Bristol a jury verdict of $1,218.42, subject to a credit for the
$355.67 draft. On appeal, held, judgment entered for the plaintiff in
the amount of $355.67,, but in other respects reversed and final
judgment for the defendant. Provident Fire Ins. Co. v. Union
Trust Corp., 195 Va. 415, 78 S.E.2nd 584 (1953).
The union mortgage clause stipulates that if the loss is directed
to be payable to the mortgagee, his interest can not be affected by
any act or omission of the mortgagor.' When a simple loss pay-
able clause appears in the requirement of insurance in a deed of
trust, it is apparently construed in Virginia to mean "full contrib-
ution in favor of the trustee as his interest may appear".! [Italics
supplied]. The Provident case is illustrative of the Virginia view
that the creditor under the simple loss payable clause is bound by
the negotiations between the insured and the insurer. In Home
Loan & Finance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,' the Alabama
court gave the corollary that the absence of the union mortgage
clause makes the wording necessarily mean "simple loss payable".
In that case the insured forfeited his fire policy because he per-
mitted complete change of ownership without the insurer's con-
sent; it was held that, in the absence of a union mortgage clause,
the creditor's claim to the proceeds must fail. In succinct lan-
guage, the court in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. German Mu-
tual Fire Ins. Assn.' said:
A policy that simply provides that it shall be payable to
the mortgagee as his interest may appear is called an
"open mortgage clause", and is the character of mortgage
clause pleaded in the petition. This clause is to be dis-
tinguished from the "union mortgage clause". In the lat-
ter clause it is stipulated, in substance, that in case of loss
the policy is payable to the mortgagee and that his interest
as payee shall not be invalidated or affected by any act or
omission of the mortgagor. Where there is merely an open
mortgage clause there is no privity created between the
company and the mortgagee, he not being a party to the
contract but merely an appointee to receive the proceeds
in case of loss. [Italics supplied]. His rights will be de-
feated by a breach of the conditions of the policy by the
mortgagor.'
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A review of the cases outside Virginia leads to no defirite
conclusion as to whether the weight of authority is for or against
construing the union clause as a separate contract," or as an ap-
pendage to the policy to be construed in the light of other pro-
visions.! The Home case' would not let the union clause have the
effect of permitting the mortgagee to recover where the mortgagee
procured additional insurance prohibited by the policy. In Trepanier
v. Mercantile Ins. Co.,' the tenant was the mortgagee and plaintiff,
while the purchaser was the insured under a policy which was to
be void if the premises were unoccupied for 30 days. In ordering
a new trial, the court observed that unoccupancy by the mortgagee
for the specified period would defeat its recovery. The Home and
Trepanier cases develop the obvious point that under either form
of loss payable clause, acts of the mortagee will prejudice the mort-
gagee where those acts would have avoided the policy if done by
the mortgagor. A case from the Ninth Circuit' goes so far as to
state that the acts or omissions of the mortgagor, even before
the endorsement of the union clause, do not prejudice the mort-
gagee after the endorsement of the union clause, where the mort-
gagee had no notice of the infirmities at the time of this en-
dorsement.
In the writer's opinion, even the union mortgage clause would
not have protected the mortagee in the Provident case, supra.
There the mortgagee had notice, and his silence operates as an
estoppel. The mere fact that a policy contains one or the other
type of mortgage clause does not of itself mean that the mortgagee
is protected against acts or omissions of the mortgagor. He cannot
simply be an ostrich and ignore notice given him.' The author of
a recent case note" disagrees and states, relative to the Provident
case, "Foresight by the mortgagee in requiring a standard mortgage
clause would have provided the broad protection sought in this
action." A Minnesota case, First National Bank of Duluth v.
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National Liberty Ins. Co.. ' might seem to lend support to his
contention, for there is considerable authority holding that the
mortgagor under such a clause can not by his own acts prejudice
the position of the mortgagee without his consent to those acts."
However, the Minnesota court clothed what was on its face a
simple loss payable clause with the attributes of the union
clause. Aside from this, the distinction between the Provident and
the First National cases is that in the former the opportunity for
the bank to speak was when it was given notice that the insured
was negotiating with the insurer. The parties to the negotiations
afforded the bank the right to participate, which was not exercised.
Hence, under either form of loss payable clause, it is submitted,
the bank has no rights under the circumstances.
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